Originally Posted by
BurlyGuys
It's very simple. Putting it to the curb is exposed to the public, and is considered abandoned property. This is why cops can search your trash without a warrant.
Putting trash in a container makes it the property of the container owner, and is transfer of ownership, not abandoning of property.
Bet that would stand up in court if cops wanted to search your dumpster instead of curb trash.
The real answer is it depends on what state you are in. Generally, once you throw something away you abandoned it as BurlyGuys suggested and any one who retrieves the items may do what they wish with them. This is supported by Federal case law.
The State law varies by jurisdiction. For example, here in Indiana, the Supreme Court decided that "trash is trash" and once you throw something away you give up all rights to the items.
A. Fourth Amendment Doctrine
Searches of garbage are generally permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Since Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment has turned on whether the subject of the search has an expectation of privacy and if so whether that subjective expectation is reasonable judged by the objective criterion of the views of society as a whole. Id. at 361, 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring). In California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988), the United States Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search of the defendant's garbage left at the curb for pickup. The Court reasoned that because the garbage was easily accessible to the public, the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of its privacy.
Federal courts have also upheld the warrantless search of garbage located on a resident's private property, focusing on the objective reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in the garbage rather than its location. Thus, in United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 797 (7th Cir.1983),
a warrantless search of the defendant's garbage was upheld where the garbage was located inside a low fence enclosing the defendant's yard. The court reasoned that the garbage had been abandoned and exposed to the public and the officers who seized the garbage did not threaten the peace and quiet of the defendant's home or interfere with his trash disposal routine. In United States v. Hedrick, 922 F.2d 396 (7th Cir.1991), the court sustained the search of trash located in the defendant's driveway eighteen feet from the sidewalk.
The court took the view that it was common knowledge that members of the public often sort though others' garbage. As a result, "an expectation of privacy may be objectively unreasonable because of the common practice of scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public in sorting through garbage. In other words, garbage placed where it is not only accessible to the public but likely to be viewed by the public is `knowingly exposed' to the public 359*359 for Fourth Amendment purposes." Id. at 400.
A majority of states follow federal doctrine and hold that their state constitutions permit a warrantless search of trash that has been left out for collection based on a lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy.[1] As the Supreme Court of Maryland explained, "the law that has emerged since Greenwood is essentially the same as it was before that case was decided, although, as a general rule, it is based less on the property concept of abandonment than on the conclusion that, by depositing the trash in a place accessible to the public, for collection, the depositor has relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy." State v. Sampson, 362 Md. 438, 765 A.2d 629, 634 (2001). Some states have rejected this view and have found trash searches violative of either the Fourth Amendment or their state constitutions. Most states reaching this conclusion have based it, contrary to Greenwood, on the view that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed out for collection.[2]
While this decision relates to police searches, this next case is on point with scrappers...
Long v. Dilling Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 705 NE 2d 1022 - Ind: Court of Appeals 1999
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Dilling maintained an office building in Logansport, Indiana. Outside of the office building was a lidded dumpster in which Dilling deposited trash. This dumpster, which Dilling leased for its exclusive use, stood on Dilling's property and was located at the curtilage about two feet from a public sidewalk. The rear of the dumpster abutted the building, and Dilling had constructed a wall slightly taller than the dumpster around the two sides of the dumpster. There was no wall in front of the dumpster, which remained open to public access. A waste management firm, pursuant to a contract with Dilling, was assigned to dispose of materials placed in the dumpster.
Since February of 1995, Long had been employed by the Association as a labor organizer. Long was seeking to organize Dilling's employees for union membership.
In the early morning of August 24, 1995, Long went to Dilling's Logansport property and removed five or six filled plastic trash bags from the dumpster. Long took these trash bags hoping they would contain records revealing the names and phone numbers of Dilling employees, with whom Long wished to discuss collective bargaining. Long took these trash bags to a hotel room, where he rummaged though the bags' contents. Long then re-bagged the trash and deposited it in the hotel's trash receptacle.
At some point, Dilling became aware of Long's activities and filed a complaint against the Defendants, alleging they were civilly liable to Dilling. Dilling claimed that Long and the other Defendants committed criminal offenses, including theft, receiving stolen property, criminal trespass, burglary and corrupt business influence. As a result, pursuant to Ind.Code §§ 34-4-30-1[1] (now Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1) and 34-4-30.5-5[2] (now 1024*1024 Ind.Code § 34-24-2-6), Dilling claimed it was entitled to treble damages.
Defendants filed a "Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment," which requested that Dilling's corrupt business influence claim be dismissed and that summary judgment be entered in their favor on Dilling's other claims. Dilling responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment. On March 24, 1997, the trial court issued an interlocutory order denying the Defendants' motion and granting Dilling's motion for summary judgment.
In that order, the trial court found that Long, by taking trash bags from the Dilling dumpster, committed theft;[3] receiving stolen property;[4] criminal trespass;[5] burglary;[6] and corrupt business influence.[7] The trial court appears to have held that not only Long, individually, but also the Association and Local 166, by application of the respondeat superior doctrine, were civilly liable to Dilling for these offenses. The trial court concluded that Dilling was entitled to have its damages determined by a jury.
On February 20, 1998, the trial court's interlocutory order was certified for appeal. We heard oral argument on August 31, 1998.
We answer that question in the affirmative and conclude that,
if a generator of trash wishes to retain ownership or control of that trash, then it must take affirmative steps to do so. Although Dilling claimed that the trash bags taken by Long contained Dilling's sensitive and confidential company documents, it took no steps to protect those documents from abandonment. Those documents were neither shredded, nor placed in locked containers nor in an area which was not readily accessible to others. When trash, whether it be documents or other discarded material, is placed in trash bags, and those trash bags are placed in an unlocked dumpster on the curtilage and readily accessible to others, that trash has been abandoned. In that context, trash is trash. As noted in Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 541 (Ind. 1994),
"[i]t has often been said that if you do not want others to know what you drink, don't put empties in the trash."
II. The Effect of Abandonment
As a result of Dilling's abandonment of its trash, its property rights were not abrogated by Long's taking of the bags. See Right Reason, 691 N.E.2d at 1351. Consequently, there can be no showing that Long committed theft, receiving stolen property, criminal trespass or burglary. In order to establish liability under any of these offenses as alleged, Dilling was required to show that it had a property right in the trash bags. Dilling cannot make this showing because it abandoned and, therefore, did not own the trash.
Nor can the Defendants be found liable for corrupt business influence. Ind.Code § 35-45-6-2 requires a "pattern of racketeering activity," which in this case would have been proven by the crimes of theft, receiving stolen property, criminal trespass and/or burglary resulting from Long's taking of the trash bags.
Since Long did not commit 1027*1027 theft, receiving stolen property, criminal trespass or burglary, there can be no "pattern of racketeering activity." As a result, the Defendants cannot be liable for corrupt business influence.
The trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in Dilling's favor. Further, as Dilling cannot recover on any of the legal theories it advances, the trial court erred in refusing to grant the Defendants' summary judgment on Dilling's other claims. We therefore hold that Defendants' "Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment" should have been granted.
- Once and for all Dumpster Diving
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